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This article examines the new statutory regime for paying damages for personal 
injury by means of periodical payments instead of a lump sum. How are such 
payments to increase in future to take account of rising care costs, especially when 
these usually form the largest part of a major award? The answer to this question is 
crucial in determining the extent that the new form of payment will be used. How 
periodical payments are to be indexed is also a key factor in calculating the total cost 
of compensation, and, in particular, in assessing the liabilities of the National Health 
Service. The issue gave rise to litigation which was voted by personal injury 
practitioners as the most important of the year. Here, that litigation and the statutory 
reforms which gave rise to it are set in their wider academic contexts. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with major developments which have taken place in the payment of 
damages for personal injury. It focuses upon recent judicial decisions which have 
given much greater incentives for periodical payments to be used instead of traditional 
lump sums. The benefits are such that periodical payments have now become “the 
compensation method of choice.”1 This article also describes the new statutory regime 
for assessing damages for losses which accrue in the future. Placing a value upon 
these future losses is especially difficult. Determining a discount rate for the lump 
sum or an index for the future uprating of periodical payments can make an enormous 
difference not only to the value of an individual claim but also to the overall cost of 
the tort system. As a result of what may appear on the surface to be small changes in 
                                                 
1
 Introduction to R. de Wilde et al, Facts and Figures (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 13
th
 ed 2008-9). 
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the numbers used, the liabilities of insurers and, in particular, the National Health 
Service (NHS) can increase substantially. The focus here is upon the indexation of 
future loss as a crucial factor in determining not only the value of a claim but also the 
extent that periodical payments will be used instead of a lump sum. This article 
describes the wider economic context within which this issue was litigated, and it 
considers the effect upon personal injury practice of these statutory and judicial 
changes. 
Because the viability of periodical payments under the new statutory regime 
depends so much upon how future losses are indexed, it was inevitable that the issue 
would reach the appellate court. In effect, Thompstone v Tameside and Glossop Acute 
Services NHS Trust
2
 not only determined the future of this new method of payment 
but also was a case worth many hundreds of millions of pounds a year.
3
 The Court of 
Appeal found in favour of the claimants, and although appeal to the House of Lords 
was mooted, it was abandoned. All parties now accept that Thompstone is the 
keystone upon which settlements are to be based. Practitioners voted it the most 
outstanding case of the year,
4
 although it received almost no academic recognition.
5
 
Academics might have been expected to look at this area closely because it is at the 
heart of the avowed aim in tort of returning the claimant, so far as is possible, to the 
financial position before injury.
6
 However, to date, the case has escaped such scrutiny. 
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The article begins with a general account of the early development of periodical 
payments and then summarises the legislative reforms which introduced the new 
statutory regime in 2005. Next the indexation issue is described, and its potential for 
causing a substantial shortfall in damages is explained. The litigation on that topic is 
chronicled, and the factors which enabled the court to select a suitable measure for 
uprating payments are set out. Finally, the effect of the changes is illustrated by 
looking at the latest statistics relating to damages paid out by the NHS. 
THE INITIAL ATTRACTIONS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS 
The lump sum system of paying damages survived almost intact until just over 
twenty years ago. Compensation almost always took the form of one large payment 
made on a once and for all basis. It is true that interim awards and provisional 
damages had made inroads upon this general principle, but the potential for seeking 
multiple payments was severely limited. Instead the traditional system continued to 
impose upon claimants an enormous responsibility for their future: they had to 
manage the lump sum in order to ensure that it would continue to meet their needs for 
the rest of their life. Unfortunately, inflation and the vagaries of the returns upon 
investment often resulted in the rapid erosion of the compensation. In addition, the 
damages were bound to be insufficient where losses continued for a longer period of 
time than that forecast in the settlement or by the court. This frequently happened 
where the compensation depended upon an assessment of life expectancy for, if the 
claimant lived longer than expected, the money was bound to run out.
7
 Recipients of 
damages awards thus had not only investment but also mortality risks thrust upon 
them, and often compensation proved insufficient.  
To counter such criticisms of the lump sum award, the concept of a structured 
settlement was imported from North America and first used for a UK resident in 
                                                 
7
  Forecasting how long a seriously injured person will live is notoriously difficult, and actuaries have 
accepted that estimating what they term an “impaired life” is much more an art rather than a science. 
R. Lewis, Structured Settlements: The Law and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) chapter 
11. 
 4 
1989.
8
 It enabled seriously injured claimants to receive regular payments which could 
be guaranteed to last for their lifetime. This was usually achieved by the defendant 
liability insurer converting part of the traditional lump sum into a series of payments 
by purchasing an annuity on the claimant’s life from a life insurance office. Because 
of this life element, payments could continue even though a claimant outlived his 
projected span of years.
9
 In addition, the payments were free of tax,
10
 and could even 
be set up to enable some claimants to retain entitlement to means-tested benefits even 
though they were receiving large regular sums.
11
 The payments could also be 
protected against inflation in prices by being tied to increases in the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI).
12
 Although this provided much more security for the future, it did not 
offer protection against the higher inflation to be expected in rising wage costs rather 
than prices. Nevertheless, claimants receiving structured payments were relieved from 
the stress of having to invest and be responsible for a lump sum far greater than most 
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people encounter in their lifetime. Overall, therefore, they could gain considerable 
reassurance about their financial future and could plan with greater confidence how to 
reconstruct their lives. 
More detailed accounts of these advantages of structured settlements can be found 
elsewhere.
13
 It was not only claimants that received the benefits. From the state’s 
viewpoint, the new form of payment was attractive because it encouraged the 
spending of damages on the purposes for which they had been awarded. The 
compensation was less likely to be dissipated as a result of mismanagement or the 
depredation of friends or relatives.
14 
The injured were then less likely to find 
themselves reliant in the longer term on the limited resources of the welfare state. 
Structured settlements were especially attractive to the NHS because they enabled 
Health Authorities to retain capital sums and defer the full costs of clinical negligence 
to the future: there was a substantial cash-flow saving. Insurers, by contrast, had much 
less to gain and were therefore often unenthusiastic about structures. However, even 
they could benefit from appearing to offer lifetime support to an injured person. For a 
variety of reasons, therefore, structures received support from many quarters. 
LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND THE REMOVAL OF THE PARTIES’ VETO15 
In spite of these benefits, further expansion of structured settlements was hindered 
by a variety of factors, the most important being the refusal by many lawyers to give 
proper consideration to the merits of the alternative form of payment. In part, this was 
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attributed to the innate conservatism of the legal profession,
16
 together with ignorance 
or misconception about what the periodical payments actually involved. Although for 
some years it was emphasised that lawyers had a duty to consider setting up a 
structured settlement and could be liable in negligence if they failed to do so,
17
 in 
practice periodical payments were obtained in only a minority of the cases in which 
they could have been sought.
18
  
The result was that, largely through inertia, the lump sum retained its dominance. 
This was aided by the fact that either of the parties unilaterally could veto any 
proposed settlement based on periodical payments.
19
 According to Lord Steyn the 
solution was straightforward: 
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“The court ought to be given the power of its own motion to make an 
award for periodic payments rather than a lump sum in appropriate 
cases…. Except perhaps for the distaste of personal injury lawyers for 
change of a familiar system, I can think of no substantial argument to the 
contrary. Only Parliament can solve the problem.” 20 
There followed a lengthy period of investigation
21
 and Government consultation
22
 
about what changes should be made. Eventually, in 2005 legislation came into force 
which removed the parties’ veto: under the Courts Act a judge was given the power to 
impose a periodical payments order (PPO) even if it were opposed by both parties.
23
 A 
former President of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers rather expansively 
concluded that the legislation was “the most important development ever relating to 
the law of damages.”24 It was certainly of great significance for it introduced a 
radically different method not only for paying damages but also for assessing them.  
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The new regime applies to any personal injury case which comes to court and 
involves future pecuniary loss. The statute then requires a judge to consider making a 
PPO. The needs of the claimant must be considered, but an order can be made even if 
it is not wanted by either of the parties and even though they both envisage alternative 
provision. Almost all cases which come to court are likely to be caught by the statute 
because they predominantly involve serious injury with a substantial part of the claim 
being for future loss.
25
 The major constituent will be for the cost of future care, 
although loss of earnings will also play a part. Although these serious injury cases are 
only a small percentage of all personal injury claims,
26
 they are responsible for a 
substantial amount of the overall damages bill: insurers have estimated that 32 per 
cent of the monies they pay to claimants derive from only one per cent of their cases, 
these being where damages of more than £100,000 are paid.
27
 In spite of the large 
sums involved, it is more likely in these serious injury cases that claimants will be 
under-compensated in the longer term.
28
 It was for these claimants, in particular, 
therefore, that the new method of assessment and payment was introduced, and it was 
for them that the issue of indexation would prove so important. 
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“BOTTOM-UP” ASSESSMENTS AFFECTING INVESTMENT AND LIFE 
EXPECTANCY RISKS 
The tradition in damages is for there to be a clean break, with the defendant giving 
the claimant a once and for all payment to end matters. In contrast, a structured 
settlement or a court ordered PPO results in a continuing relationship between the 
parties with payments that will vary over time. However, the Courts Act made the 
distinction between the different forms of payment very much greater by conferring 
upon PPOs particular advantages over the previous ways in which damages were paid. 
The Act not only fundamentally changed the way in which damages are assessed, but 
it also offered claimants considerable incentives to seek PPOs rather than lump sums. 
PPOs were also given advantages over structured settlements negotiated out of court.  
The key distinguishing feature of a PPO is that, unlike nearly all structures, there is 
no need to calculate any lump sum in order to work out what periodical payments 
must be made. Instead, using a “bottom-up” approach, the court assesses the 
periodical payments the claimant needs for the future irrespective of their capital cost. 
These annual payments do not have to be adjusted to take account of speculative 
estimates of the claimant’s life expectancy. Nor do returns have to be forecast of the 
income that arises upon investment of the damages: the lump sum is not there to 
invest. Instead, the defendant must comply with the order to make the specified 
regular payments no matter how the market performs and even if the claimant lives 
longer than forecast. In contrast to the traditional lump sum system, therefore, it is the 
defendant rather than the claimant who is exposed to an uncertain financial future by 
being burdened with the twin risks of investment return and mortality. 
This can be explained further by noting that in the calculations needed for a PPO 
there is no place for the ‘Ogden Tables.’29 That is, multipliers and discount rates are 
not used: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of the loss in order to 
convert it into an immediate capital amount; and no discount rate is needed to convert 
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the future stream of financial losses into a capital sum representing present day values. 
The discount rate, in particular, continues to operate very harshly against claimants 
negotiating lump sums.
30
 This is because it expects claimants to obtain an unrealistic 
rate of return on their damages award. However, when PPOs are being considered, 
defendants cannot take advantage of the artificially high estimate of investment return 
embedded in the discount rate for lump sums. Instead they can be ordered to provide 
annual payments irrespective of what this might cost as an equivalent capital sum. 
Furthermore, the order extends for an uncertain period – the rest of the claimant’s life. 
The risks of uncertainty traditionally run by claimants have thus been transferred to 
defendants. 
THE INDEXATION ISSUE AND THE POTENTIAL SHORTFALL IN PAYMENTS 
In spite of the considerable advantages offered by PPOs as a result of this transfer 
of the mortality and investment risks there was still concern that new form of payment 
might not be widely used. For almost three years after the Courts Act came into force 
it was thought that the lump sum might be more flexible, and better able to deal with 
the claimant’s needs. This argument succeeded in a number of cases with the result 
that, although PPOs were being considered, ultimately they were often rejected. Why 
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Soc Gazette 22 and E. Tomlinson, “Budgeting on a Lump Sum Settlement” [2009] J Personal Injury 
Law 164.  
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were claimants’ lawyers and courts having doubts about the efficacy of judicial 
“bottom-up” assessments which transferred the above risks? The answer lay in 
concern about exposing the claimant to another risk: this was that the periodical 
payments would not offer sufficient protection against anticipated increases in care 
costs because these were more affected by wage rates rather than prices. Although 
protection against price increases could be guaranteed, protection against wage 
increases could not. Whether it could be achieved depended on how payments were to 
be indexed. This was crucial to the future use of periodical payments. 
Periodical payments have the advantage of providing certainty of provision for life. 
However, unless they are linked to an appropriate index the certainty they achieve 
may become the certainty of under-provision. The concern was that, even if periodical 
payments were tied to increases in the RPI, they would be insufficient to meet the 
claimant’s future needs. This is because home care costs make up only about one tenth 
of one per cent of the RPI, and they have only a limited relationship with increases in 
the price of those consumer goods and services which dominate the index. Most future 
losses of personal injury claimants are directly or indirectly related not to price 
increases but to earnings. In particular, a very large element of future care costs is 
dependent upon the earnings of those workers who provide the care: in the leading 
case the non-earnings element of care was expected to be only three per cent of the 
total care costs.
31
 Historically, on average, for the past seventy years the earnings of 
the population at large has risen about two per cent more a year than prices.
32
 
Claimants and their advisors therefore feared that if this general trend were also to 
apply to care workers, then any award of periodical payments based on the RPI would 
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prove insufficient to meet long-term care needs.
33
 Indeed, it is likely that the 
difference between indexation based upon price as opposed to wage inflation will be 
apparent in the very first year in which care is provided. The obvious disparity 
between the payments led the judge to refuse to make a PPO in, for example, A v B 
Health Hospitals NHS Trust.
34
 It was thought that the claimant would be better off 
with the flexibility of a lump. 
To illustrate the potential for under-compensation let us assume that the claimant 
obtains a periodical payment award of £10,000 a year to cover future care costs. If the 
award were linked to the RPI and if that index rose by, say, 2.5 per cent a year then, 
after 30 years, the amount being paid would be £20,975. However, if the award were 
indexed to reflect earnings growth at 2 per cent above RPI, the amount to be paid 
would rise to £37,500 a year. The cumulative deficit over the 30 year period would 
then be £171,000 and the claimant would be receiving insufficient to meet his current 
costs. The deficit resulting from the difference between prices and earnings would 
continue to grow, and the support given to the claimant would continue to diminish.
35
 
The capital value of the difference between the indices is a substantial sum: a two per 
cent difference over 40 years will cost defendants an extra £200,000 in immediate 
lump sum terms for each £10,000 a year required. In one recent case the cost of the 
private nursing home was £132,000 a year and this was projected to last another 48 
years.
36
 If an earnings index were used in this case it would have increased the lump 
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sum required by more than £3 million. The NHS is considerably affected by such 
indexation because it has a disproportionate number of these complex and expensive 
care cases. 
There are two examples of notable past cases which further illustrate how 
periodical payments could prove insufficient to meet the increasing costs of care.
37
  
The first case is of some prominence because originally it had come before the Court 
of Appeal to determine whether certain social security monies could be claimed even 
though substantial structured settlement payments were being received.
38
 It involved 
Charles Beattie who was only 17 years old in 1987 when he suffered severe brain 
damage and was made quadriplegic as a result of a car accident. Five years later he 
obtained a million and a half pounds in damages. Some of this money was used to 
meet his immediate needs, and some was placed in a contingency fund to deal with 
unexpected future requirements. The remaining million pounds was paid into a 
structured settlement to fund his current care costs. This produced RPI linked 
payments of more than £5,000 a month, as well as payments of £10,000 every three 
years to cover the purchase of specialised equipment. However, the Master of the 
Court of Protection has revealed that these payments have proved insufficient.
39
 In the 
twelve years following the court award, although the RPI linked payments rose by 35 
per cent, the cost of care rose by 60 per cent, this being roughly in line with the 
growth in average earnings. As a result, Charles Beattie cannot pay for the full 
package of care that he needs from the income he receives from his structured 
settlement. 
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The second case to illustrate the potential shortfall is the landmark decision from 
twenty years ago of Kelly v Dawes.
40
 This was the first case in which a judge 
approved a structured settlement for a U.K. resident. Catherine Kelly, a 22 year old 
nurse, was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, Andrew, a stonemason. Not far 
from their home they were involved in a road accident caused entirely by the 
negligence of another. Both drivers were killed. Catherine lost the husband she had 
recently married, and suffered catastrophic injuries herself. In seeking damages on her 
behalf, Catherine's father was keen to ensure that she would be looked after in her 
private nursing home for the rest of her life. Any money that might accrue to her estate 
upon her death was not an important consideration. Instead the major concern was 
that, given her very uncertain life expectancy, the damages should be managed in 
order to ensure that, if she lived longer than the projected period, there would continue 
to be money to pay for her care. The best means of achieving this proved to be via a 
structured settlement which, because it could be linked to a life annuity, could be 
guaranteed to be in payment for the rest of Catherine’s life. 
Catherine’s settlement undoubtedly has proven a favourable one for her. She 
continues to receive payments even though she has now outlived not only the 
pessimistic life expectancy relied upon by the defendant insurers, but also the 
compromised figure that would have been agreed by the parties had only a lump sum 
been paid. As a result of the structure, her family gained the reassurance that she 
would continue to be looked after for the rest of her life. Payments for her began at 
£2,146 a month but were to rise in line with the RPI. As a result, they increased on 
average by about 3.1 per cent a year and amounted to just over £4,000 a month in 
2009. However, it has recently been revealed that these payments have been 
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“considerably outstripped” by the present nursing home care costs.41 The shortfall is 
currently being met out of her contingency fund. This capital sum derived, firstly, 
from the equity in Catherine's home which was sold because she could no longer live 
there and, secondly, from the estate she inherited from her husband, including the 
damages for his fatal accident. Although the case illustrates how RPI linking can lead 
to under-compensation, it should be emphasised that at the date of settlement this 
problem had not been recognised and that it was not until the new millennium that the 
effect of RPI linking on future care costs was called into question. Even if the issue 
had been aired in 1989, it is likely that the life expectancy aspect would have 
persuaded the court that periodical payments, although RPI linked, were in 
Catherine’s best interests. 
THE INDEXATION LITIGATION 
What provision did the Courts Act make for the indexation of the new periodical 
payments regime it established? Although it made RPI the default index for PPOs, it 
also allowed for that index to be modified or replaced.
42
 This caused much uncertainty 
because the legislation did not specify when it would be appropriate to make such a 
departure from RPI. In Parliamentary debates on the Courts Bill the Minister, 
Baroness Scotland, said that it was intended that RPI should be the norm, but that it 
could be departed from “in exceptional circumstances.”43 Although this phrase was 
also contained in a first draft of the Explanatory Notes to the Courts Act, it was later 
revised to refer only to “appropriate” circumstances, and again these were not defined. 
In the final version of the Notes the guidance is only that it is expected that RPI will 
be used in the great majority of cases.
44
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The Government’s failure to give clear guidance, only partly the result of a 
Minister inexperienced in personal injury matters, was very unfortunate. Litigation 
was the inevitable result. The first case was a pre-emptive attack by one insurer 
seeking to strike out the claimant’s pleading that there should be a departure from the 
RPI. The insurer contended that “exceptional circumstances” were required. Many 
defendants did not support this tactic of challenging the claimant’s case in a 
preliminary hearing when the burden upon the party seeking the order is higher. In 
particular, the NHS Litigation Authority was not a party to the action. Reservations 
about the tactic proved well merited: both at first instance and before the Court of 
Appeal the attempt to prevent departure from RPI because there were no exceptional 
circumstances failed. In Flora v Wakom
45
 the claimants had won the first round. 
However, the Court of Appeal in Flora also suggested that further cases should be 
grouped together and brought before it so that it could examine the issue of indexation 
in a full hearing. Eventually this was done in the key case of Thompstone v Tameside 
and Glossop Acute Services NHS Trust.
46
 In fact only four cases were heard together, 
and unlike in the striking out action, it was the NHS Litigation Authority rather than 
insurers that took the case forward. It had to act alone because, according to its 
counsel, insurers “expressed little interest in these appeals.”47 Insurers may either have 
feared that their case had already been fatally compromised by the Flora decision, or 
may have mistakenly believed that they could buy off the prospect of PPOs by 
offering claimants larger lump sums instead. At all events, the defendants were not co-
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ordinated in their attempts to limit the effect of the new legislation, and they seemed 
to have considerable doubts about whether their arguments would prevail. 
These reservations proved to be well founded when, both at first instance and on 
appeal, the claimants once more triumphed. The Court of Appeal considered itself 
bound by the previous decision in Flora to reject the submission that exceptional 
circumstances were needed to depart from the RPI. In addition, the Court recognised 
that PPOs created a quite different payment mechanism from lump sums so that, in 
effect, two separate regimes were now operating within the tort system. It rejected the 
suggestion that there would be “an unacceptable divergence” if a wage related index 
were used for PPOs and a price related index for lump sums. However, it cannot be 
disputed that a divergence arises. It is created because the traditional lump sum, unlike 
a PPO, calculates a present value for the claimant’s future losses by using a discount 
rate set at 2.5 per cent. This rate, in theory, is supposed to represent the real return the 
claimant can obtain by investing the damages received.
48
 This real return makes 
allowance both for the tax the claimant must pay on the income from investing the 
damages and for the reduction in the value of that income caused by inflation. 
However, the rate takes into account only the inflation in prices, not that in wages. 
This was confirmed in Cooke v United Bristol Healthcare
49
 where the court 
steadfastly refused to depart from price inflation when assessing the lump sum. Here, 
then, is clear water between the methods used to allow for inflation when calculating a 
lump sum as opposed to a PPO, the one being based on prices, the other on earnings.  
Finally, the judges in Thompstone also rejected arguments against the use of an 
earnings index which were based on “distributive justice.” Defendants reasonably 
feared that this index would lead to much higher payments with the result that the 
NHS, in particular, would be adversely affected. An actuary giving evidence on behalf 
of the NHS argued that the increase in value for clinical claims already in existence 
would be £1.678 billion. Although the trial judge rejected this as a significant over-
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estimate because it was based on a flawed empirical study, she agreed that the increase 
in cost would be “very significant.”50 In the past there had been limited evidence that 
NHS wards might have to be closed in order to pay for damages awards.
51
 However, 
these arguments, based on the wider social benefit of retaining existing damages 
levels, were considered irrelevant by the Court of Appeal. It conceded that distributive 
justice might be relevant when considering whether a duty of care was owed, or 
whether the general level of damages for non-pecuniary loss was appropriate. 
However, distributive justice was said to have no part to play after liability had been 
established when the only remaining issue was the calculation of precise financial 
losses, as opposed to general damages for pain and suffering.
52
 Overall, the claimants 
thus far had won a resounding victory of principle, but what would it mean in 
practice? 
WHICH METHOD OF INDEXATION? 
Although there were these strong arguments of principle for departing from the 
RPI, there were practical difficulties in setting an alternative.
53
 Was there another 
index that could be used? If not, as in the case of a claimant resident in Ireland where 
no appropriate index could be identified,
54
 then perhaps only RPI linking or a lump 
sum could be awarded. One alternative suggestion was that a fixed percentage above 
the RPI should be used, but this rough and ready solution never formally came before 
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a court.
55
 Another possibility was to use earnings indices that were being employed 
elsewhere. However, these alternative measures were not being used by lawyers or 
courts. In addition, they produced figures which could vary significantly. For example, 
different earnings figures could be derived from the likes of, firstly, local authority 
based rates of pay for carers; secondly, the British Nursing Association recommended 
rates for carers; thirdly, indices used to manage health care efficiency;
56
 and, finally, 
Government figures of average earnings for different sections of the workforce. Some 
of these alternative indices were officially compiled by state agencies, others came 
from private bodies; some had a longer history or were more consistently produced 
than others; and some were able to look more precisely at particular sections of the 
workforce. Because each set of figures was open to some criticism, there was no 
immediately obvious alternative index that could be used. 
An academic labour economist, Dr Victoria Wass of Cardiff University, had a 
major influence on the Court in determining which path to take. She was described by 
the trial judge as “an impressive witness.”57 The Court of Appeal accepted the 
following criteria that she suggested for adopting an alternative measure to RPI which 
would approximate to the salary-based costs of home care: 
“(i) accuracy of match of the particular data series to the loss or 
expenditure being compensated;  
(ii) authority of the collector of the data;  
(iii) statistical reliability;  
(iv) accessibility;  
(v) consistency over time;  
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(vi) reproducibility in the future;  
(vii) simplicity and consistency in application.”58 
Using these factors, Wass concluded that the Court should choose between two 
official earnings data sources, one being the Average Earnings Index (AEI) and the 
other the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).  Both are produced with the 
authority of the Office of National Statistics, the first dating back to 1963 and the 
second, only to 1998.  
The AEI plots average earnings growth by surveying each month the payments 
made by 8,400 employers to about 9 million employees. It takes into account bonuses, 
allowances and overtime to arrive at an average earnings figure. However, the Court 
rejected the use of this index because, although long established, accessible and well 
known, the information it provides is too general. In particular, it does not relate to 
particular employments. Instead it is based on the mean level of earnings for all 
workers and, crucially for present purposes, it does not directly relate to the earnings 
of the one in 40 employees who work as carers. Their earnings are likely to be lower 
than average and, as a result, if the AEI were to be used it would probably overstate 
the claimant’s future care needs. Instead of using this index the Court adopted the 
more precise measure of earnings contained in the more complex ASHE data because 
it could be related to specific occupations. 
Like the AEI, ASHE is based on a representative survey of earnings and appears as 
a statement of earnings levels instead of a numerical index such as the RPI. At first it 
may appear less useful than AEI because fewer people are surveyed and the data is 
collected less frequently: the survey takes place only once a year as opposed to once a 
month, and it covers only about one per cent of those employees paying tax on a pay-
as-you-earn basis, these numbering about 245,000 workers. However, ASHE data has 
become increasingly more sophisticated. Its crucial advantage over the AEI is that it 
can be sub-divided to account for different occupational groups and different levels of 
earnings within occupational groups. 
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The important group for present purposes is that numbered 6115 comprising “Care 
Assistants and Home Carers.” There were 6,630 employees who fell into this group to 
constitute the representative sample in 2006. ASHE reflects the specific factors which 
have affected individual groups so that, for example, it is apparent that the earnings of 
care assistants in the last decade have risen much faster than average earnings overall. 
In addition, the specific data for the occupational group can be further subdivided into 
ten parts according to their hourly rate of pay. This enables separate tracking of the 
earnings of the more skilled carers who are likely to be placed at the top of the 
earnings scale. As a result it is now common to see a PPO tied, for example, to the 
70
th
 percentile of ASHE 6115 (where 30 per cent of carers earn more than that rate 
and 70 per cent less). Which exact percentile is to be used in a particular case depends 
upon which is nearest to the weighted average hourly rate of pay of the different carers 
in the overall package which has been specifically designed for the claimant. This 
weighted rate of pay thus depends upon the complexity of care provided in each case. 
Potentially this can be a difficult and controversial calculation because it will include 
different rates of pay for day, night and weekend work, as well as different rates for 
the levels of experience and skill of the carers. Defendants can be expected to examine 
such calculations closely and readily contest them. 
Arguments about the weighted rate of pay for the different carers and the hours that 
they work illustrate that there is still scope for dispute. However, the Court has tried to 
limit other disagreements by discouraging certain lines of attack. Having accepted that 
the appropriate measure for the test cases before them was ASHE 6115, the Court of 
Appeal was not prepared for that issue to be re-opened in later cases unless 
substantially different evidence and new arguments were produced. Judges were 
instructed to have no hesitation in striking out attempts by the parties to do otherwise. 
Similarly, the Court was against defendants calling their own expert evidence to show 
that a PPO does not best meet the claimant’s needs.59 Finally, in order to make the 
ASHE 6115 data more easily workable, a model Schedule to the PPO was approved 
for the many cases which had been among those stayed to await the Thompstone 
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ruling.
60
 Again practitioners were warned that courts would make it difficult for them 
to depart from this Schedule. As a result of these measures one judge hoped that “[t]he 
armies of experts will then be able to strike their tents and return to the offices or 
academic groves from which they came.”61 Although this may happen with regard to 
the principle of indexation, the assistance given by experts on the facts of specific 
cases will not diminish. Their employment in a wide variety of personal injury 
contexts has continued at an increasing pace, and is a very distinctive feature of such 
litigation today compared even to the recent past. 
INDEXATION OF FUTURE LOSSES OTHER THAN CARE 
If departure from RPI is justified to take account of earnings when assessing care 
costs, it appears logical to extend the argument to the calculation of damages for the 
loss of future earnings themselves. At present the claimant’s lump sum damages are 
frozen at the date of trial or settlement, and no allowance is made for the anticipated 
rise in the standard of living which all workers are expected to enjoy in the future.
62 
Of course, allowance is made for the higher wages resulting from prospects of 
promotion, but not for the increases that might be expected because of the rise in 
living standards. This seriously limits the size of the lump sum award,
63
 and gives the 
lie to the avowed aim of returning the claimant to the pre-accident position.  
However, in periodical payment cases claimants will now be able to enjoy future 
increases in the standard of living because in Sawar v Ali
64
 the court ordered that a 
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suitable earnings index rather than RPI should be used to uprate the payments. In this 
case Waseem Sarwar, a 17 year old passenger in a car, was rendered tetraplegic as a 
result of the driver’s negligence. In spite of his very serious injuries, he was expected 
to live to the age of 72. He would need extensive full time care. In lump sum terms 
and before a 25 per cent discount was applied for failing to wear a seatbelt, the judge 
valued the case at over £9.5 million. He decided that, although the claimant had yet to 
sit his A level examinations, he would have obtained a professional qualification and 
relatively high earnings. He forecast that Waseem would have been employed in the 
field of finance, economics or accountancy. All four financial experts in the case 
agreed that it would be inappropriate to use the RPI to compensate for the future loss 
of earnings. Instead the judge awarded periodical payments linked to the 90
th
 
percentile of the aggregate figure for ASHE. That is, he forecast that Waseem would 
have been in the top ten per cent of all earners. The case is typical of serious injury 
cases in that Waseem’s lost earnings comprised only about 10 per cent of the total 
award, whereas more than 50 per cent of the award was for future care costs. For both 
types of loss the judge ordered periodical payments linked to ASHE. He did so even 
though the claimant changed his mind at the last minute and expressed a wish for all 
his compensation to be paid in one lump sum. This request was refused because the 
expert evidence was compelling in favour of most of the compensation being paid via 
periodical payments. As a result, Waseem was left with a lump sum of less than a 
quarter of the size that he would otherwise have received. The case illustrates several 
important features of the new regime, but for present purposes its key point is that 
earnings losses as well as care costs can be subject to higher indexation. 
How should other heads of future loss be indexed? Sums for the supply of 
equipment, aids to mobility, transport and so on have been indexed in line with the 
RPI, although there are arguments that the technological advances in rehabilitation are 
not only proceeding rapidly but also at a cost that makes the RPI no longer 
appropriate. In addition, there are doubts about how to index the running costs of 
accommodation, and how to deal with Court of Protection costs, especially following 
their increase by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It is also unclear to what extent the 
cost of certain treatments or therapies should be tied to an earnings index. However, 
overall these uncertainties are relatively minor now that it is clear that both the future 
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cost of care and the loss of earnings are no longer subject to the limit of RPI 
indexation.  
THE EFFECT UPON THE NHS 
Although the full effects of Thompstone have still to be worked out, its significance 
can be assessed by looking at the impact it has already made upon claims against the 
NHS. The NHS has favoured the use of periodical payments for many years.
65
 One 
reason for this is that, unlike many insurers, the NHS has been able to self-fund such 
awards, thereby ensuring that it can defer large capital payments to later years. PPOs 
provide a means of paying for today’s injuries tomorrow. The NHS Litigation 
Authority has stated that even after the adverse decision in Thompstone, it will 
continue to encourage the use of periodical payments because it considers “them to be 
the fairest method, both for claimants and the NHS, of settling most, if not all, high 
value personal injury claims, where future costs are significant.” 66  
Because of this general attitude, therefore, the indexation issue is of particular 
importance to the NHS. A second reason is that indexation affects a disproportionate 
number of clinical negligence cases because these are more likely to involve serious 
injuries when compared to the cases dealt with by liability insurers or other 
defendants. The high number of cases affected is illustrated by the fact that 104 NHS 
cases were stayed awaiting the Thompstone decision. These cases have now almost all 
been settled. Added to this backlog of PPO cases are those where claimants, as well as 
the NHS, now appreciate fully the additional benefits offered by the new method of 
settlement. It is therefore not surprising that the most recent figures from the NHS 
Litigation Authority show a substantial increase in the cumulative number of 
periodical payment cases: in the last three years they have risen from 471 in March 
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2007, to 548 in 2008, and to 659 in 2009.
67
 The current provision for all of these 
periodical payments amounts to £1,373 million. 
Thompstone not only influences the extent that PPOs are used in NHS cases but 
also the amount of damages that are at stake. The NHS Litigation Authority has 
acknowledged that 2009 was a “challenging year” partly because Thompstone had 
made a “significant impact” upon the amount that it had to pay in settlements. This is 
illustrated by the overall increase in the cost of serious injury claims: the size of the 
average claim over a £1 million rose by more than a third, increasing by £1 million to 
£3.7 million.
68
 This higher cost per claim partly accounted for the 22 per cent rise in 
the cost of all claims made against the NHS in the last year: the total sum rose from 
£661 million to £807 million. In part this was due to an unusual and unexplained 11 
per cent rise in the number rather than the value of claims.
69
 However, the increasing 
cost per claim was also a major factor, and it was Thompstone that largely accounted 
for the increase in the cost of long term care cases. Anticipating a further rise in 
overall costs, the Authority announced that premiums had risen by 53 per cent from 
£467 million to £713 million. Again this was partly due to the Court of Appeal 
decision. Overall it is clear that Thompstone has already had a major impact upon the 
cost of NHS litigation. 
THE LIMITS OF PERIODICAL PAYMENTS 
Although the precise scope for using PPOs subject to the new indexing provisions 
has not been finally determined, all parties now accept that they will become an 
increasingly important feature of settlement negotiations and personal injury awards. 
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However, lump sums will continue to be the form in which the vast majority of claims 
will be compensated. Why is this so and what limits the potential use of PPOs? 
The most important factor is that PPOs can only be imposed if there is future loss; 
past losses or non-pecuniary loss can only form a part of the Order if the parties agree. 
Future loss is unusual, only occurring in about 1 in 14 personal injury cases.
70
 This is 
because the vast majority of claims are for minor injury where there are no continuing 
ill-effects and where the average payment is for but a few thousand pounds. In such 
cases a lump sum is obviously the most efficient and fairest way of disposing of the 
claim. 
Even where the losses are severe and the damages are substantial a PPO can be 
avoided by the parties if they settle out of court. By striking a deal a claimant can 
arrange for the payment to be in the form of a lump sum alone. It is then possible to 
avoid judicial involvement in the amount of capital to be received and the timing of 
payments. However, those representing claimants who want to take this course should 
ensure that they have explained fully the advantages of PPOs. Their clients must give 
informed consent to the alternative form of settlement being proposed. Even in such 
cases PPOs will very much affect the bargaining process: as explained elsewhere, the 
threat of burdening a defendant with continuing payments can be used to gain higher 
lump sum awards.
71
 
When a future loss case comes to court there will still be instances of where a judge 
will consider it inappropriate to order periodical payments. For example, the 
flexibility offered by the lump sum will be an important factor where the claimant’s 
care needs are extremely difficult to forecast and could vary considerably.
72
 Again, if 
the damages are insufficient to fund the periodical payments needed to meet the 
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claimant’s current care costs then a lump sum will be preferred.73 This may happen 
where the damages have been reduced for contributory negligence, or where a 
settlement figure is compromised to allow for the difficulties of establishing liability 
in court. Particular problems could be caused where the claimant has obtained large 
interim lump sum payments.
74
 The need to purchase suitable accommodation is not 
always easily met from the capital available to the claimant, and judges could be 
persuaded that a PPO is then inappropriate. Finally, where security of payment is an 
issue and the defendant is unable to satisfy the judge that future payments are assured, 
a lump sum may be preferred.
75
  
CONCLUSION  
The new periodical payments regime introduced by the Courts Act 2005 is a major 
development in tort law. A real attempt has been made by the legislature to meet the 
future needs of claimants and thus move closer towards restorative justice. However, 
the key to the extent to which periodical payments will be used is the method by 
which they are to be indexed, and this was left for the courts to decide. It is not 
surprising that the case which determined this issue was selected by personal injury 
practitioners as the most important of its year. The Thompstone decision, although 
neglected by academics, is a landmark case in the law of tort. It goes a long way 
towards reassuring a few very seriously injured tort claimants that their future will be 
more secure. 
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